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Sudan: Darfur and Beyond
AfricaFocus Bulletin
Sep 12, 2004 (040912)
(Reposted from sources cited below)
Editor's Note
U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell's statement last week that the
Sudanese government and its proxy militias have indeed committed
genocide in Darfur caught media attention and incrementally
increased the pressure on the Khartoum regime to rein in the
violence. However, the Secretary of State also noted that the
determination in itself dictated no new action by Washington. The
political will of the international community to increase pressure
remains in doubt. How best to focus such pressure is also under
debate.
This issue of AfricaFocus Bulletin contains excerpts from two
recent reports on Sudan, by the International Crisis Group and
Justice Africa. While the two reports differ on the issue of
sanctions, both stress not only the need for stepped-up pressure on
Khartoum, but also that the scope of such pressure must extend
beyond Darfur to the stalled peace agreement in the south and
issues of national governance as well.
The point was underlined by a speech on Friday to the Congressional
Black Caucus by southern Sudanese leader John Garang, who said
stopping the violence required a neutral force of 30,000 troops,
including one-third each from the Sudanese government, the Sudanese
People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLA/M), and the African Union.
The force should be funded by the international community and
monitored by international observers, he added.
[
http://allafrica.com/stories/200409120001.html].
Secretary of State Powell's testimony, including his conclusion
that genocide has been committed in Darfur, is available at
http://allafrica.com/stories/200409090553.html. The Department of
State's investigative report on Darfur is available at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/36028.htm.
++++++++++++++++++++++end editor's note+++++++++++++++++++++++
Darfur Deadline: A New International Action Plan
International Crisis Group
Africa Report No. 83, 23 August 2004
Executive Summary and Recommendations
[excerpts only; full text of summary and of report available on
http://www.crisisweb.org]
The international response to the crisis in the western Sudanese
region of Darfur remains limp and inadequate, its achievements so
far desperately slight. The UN Security Council must, by its
review deadline of 30 August 2004, endorse a new international
action plan -- taking tougher measures against the Khartoum
government, which has acted in bad faith throughout the crisis,
and authorising the African Union (AU), with stronger
international support, to follow up more decisively its efforts
to improve the situation on the ground and mediate a political
settlement.
History has shown that Khartoum will respond constructively to
direct pressure, but this pressure must be concerted, consistent
and genuine. Its sixteen-month ethnic cleansing campaign has
elicited a slow-motion reaction which is having a negligible
positive impact. ...
On 30 July 2004 the UN Security Council finally passed its first
resolution in response to the atrocities, including killings and
systematic rape, being committed in Darfur, but that resolution
was most notable for what it failed to do. It placed an
essentially meaningless arms embargo on the Janjaweed militias
who have caused so much havoc and the rebels alike, but directed
no measures at the Sudanese government for whom the Janjaweed
have acted as a proxy and left officials in Khartoum confident
they could continue indefinitely to deflect pressure to resolve
the crisis. ...
Months after Secretary Powell warned that significant
international action could be only days away and Secretary
General Annan raised the possibility of military intervention,
Khartoum remains adept at saying and doing just enough to avoid a
robust international response. Key officials, particularly within
military intelligence, continue to undermine avenues toward
peace, directing integration of the Janjaweed into official
security bodies like the police, army and Popular Defence Forces
(a paramilitary arm of the government), rather than disarming
them. ...
The one bright spot is the AU's increasingly energetic response.
The regional organisation's observers in Darfur have filed
reports that demonstrate the ceasefire is being violated
regularly by both sides but particularly by the government. Its
some 100 observers are being joined by a force of 300 Nigerian
and Rwandan troops who will protect them, and it has intensified
planning for a much larger force of some 3,000 troops that it
wants to use for the wider purpose of protecting civilians. The
European Union (EU), the U.S. and others who have indicated a
willingness to support, logistically and financially, the
deployment and maintenance of such a force must convincingly
demand that Khartoum accept it and its mandate.
The Darfur situation poses an ever greater threat to the nearly
finalised peace agreement to end the larger and older civil war
between the government and the insurgent Sudan People's
Liberation Army (SPLA). As long as Darfur festers, the chance
remains for political forces in Khartoum opposed to the
concessions that have been made in that negotiation to turn
government policy back toward war. There is also less prospect
that a final agreement with the SPLA, even if signed, could be
implemented, or that there would be the necessary support in the
West to provide both sides the help they need to make that
agreement work.
It is vital, therefore, for the AU also to enhance its efforts to
mediate the political problems at the root of the Darfur crisis.
The international community must provide full support to the
AU-sponsored Darfur talks, such as those scheduled to begin on 23
August in Abuja, while it helps keep the government/SPLA
negotiation under the regional organisation IGAD
(Inter-governmental Authority on Development) moving forward. The
two sets of peace talks are very much interrelated. For example,
the AU should utilise the terms of the deal that has been struck
on the Nuba Mountains and Southern Blue Nile as a starting point
for its work on the Darfur negotiations. The international
community must support both processes robustly, and the mediation
teams should find ways to coordinate closely. Had there been a
comprehensive national peace process from the outset, the Darfur
rebellion might well have been avoided: the need now is to
maximise linkages and leverage.
Recommendations
To the UN Security Council:
1. Pass a resolution on 30 August 2004 that:
(a) concludes that the Government of Sudan has not satisfactorily
fulfilled its obligations within the time period established by
Resolution 1556 of 30 July 2004;
(b) imposes mandatory targeted sanctions against specific
government officials most responsible for supporting the
atrocities in Darfur and against the key businesses of the ruling
National Congress Party (NCP), particularly those doing business
abroad and those in the oil services sector;
(c) imposes a mandatory, comprehensive and monitored arms embargo
against the government;
(d) authorises the African Union (AU) to form, lead and deploy to
Darfur a mission consisting of at least 3,000 troops -- and
preferably many more -- with a mandate to provide civilian
protection and use force as necessary, demands that the
Government of Sudan accept such a mission and cooperate with it,
and indicates that if such cooperation is not forthcoming urgent
consideration will be given to appropriate further action;
(e) demands that the Government of Sudan accept deployment of a
substantially enlarged contingent of UN Human Rights Monitors
from the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)
and cooperate with it; and
(f) authorises an International Commission of Inquiry into war
crimes and crimes against humanity, including systematic rape and
other gender-based violence, committed during the Darfur
conflict.
To the African Union (AU):
2. Continue and expand urgent efforts to resolve the Darfur
crisis, in particular by:
(a) completing the deployment to Darfur of personnel to monitor
the 8 April 2004 ceasefire agreement and the deployment of the
Rwandan and Nigerian-led force to protect those monitors;
(b) raising and deploying, under UN Security Council
authorisation, an AU-led mission consisting of at least 3,000
troops -- and preferably many more -- to provide civilian
protection in Darfur, using force if necessary;
(c) being prepared to request further assistance from the UN,
such as the imposition of a no-fly zone, and from member states
as may be needed should cooperation not be forthcoming from the
Government of Sudan or the environment in Darfur otherwise proves
to be hostile; and
(d) pursuing mediation of serious political negotiations between
the Government of Sudan and the SLA and JEM movements on an
agreement that addresses the root causes of the conflict.
To the U.S., EU and Others Willing to Support the AU Initiatives:
3. Increase assistance immediately to the AU-led Ceasefire
Commission charged with monitoring and facilitating
implementation of the 8 April 2004 ceasefire agreement and apply
pressure to all sides to implement fully their commitments under
that agreement.
4. Work with the AU to provide strong support, including funding,
equipment, and transportation logistics (e.g., helicopters and
other airlift capacity), for the rapid deployment to Darfur and
effective operation there of an AU-led mission consisting of at
least 3,000 troops mandated to protect civilians, using force if
necessary.
5. Develop contingency plans to provide appropriate military
reinforcement to the AU-led mission if it encounters serious
resistance.
6. Make clear to the Government of Sudan that it cannot expect to
receive the kind of peace benefit that would otherwise be its due
in the event of reaching a peace agreement with the SPLA unless
it meets its international commitments on Darfur and otherwise
cooperates in resolving that crisis promptly.
To the UN and International Donors:
7. Support an urgent surge in humanitarian capacity for Darfur by
fully funding the UN humanitarian appeal and providing logistical
support, including military transport where necessary, to enable
much greater levels of assistance to be provided rapidly to a
larger number of locations in Chad and Darfur.
8. Negotiate with the Government of Sudan and the SLA and JEM
movements to begin immediately cross-line humanitarian aid
deliveries to civilian populations in rebel-held areas, while
making contingency plans to distribute such aid in the event that
access is denied.
To the Government of Sudan:
9. Immediately implement steps to neutralise the Janjaweed
militia and stabilise the situation in Darfur ... Specifically,
the government should:
(a) identify all militia groups it has armed and supported during
the course of the rebellion;
(b) cut off all material and political support to the Janjaweed;
(c) begin to demobilise the Janjaweed;
(d) expel all foreign elements within the Janjaweed;
(e) dismiss senior military intelligence officials responsible
for the policy of arming the Janjaweed and turning them loose
against civilians; and
(f) initiate legal action against individual Janjaweed
responsible for war crimes.
10. Allow unobstructed humanitarian access immediately to all
areas of Darfur and cease using claims of security considerations
as justification for obstructing the delivery of humanitarian
aid.
11. Accept the deployment in Darfur of an African Union (AU)
mission consisting of at least 3,000 troops, with a mandate to
provide civilian protection, and cooperate with that mission.
12. Allow full access immediately to Human Rights Monitors from
the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR).
To the Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (SLA), and the Justice and
Equality Movement (JEM):
13. Immediately implement all provisions of the 8 April 2004
ceasefire agreement and in particular cease attacks on aid
convoys to government-controlled areas, while facilitating
humanitarian relief to areas under rebel control by establishing
teams to assist populations to receive and make use of aid.
14. Clarify political agendas in advance of the formal initiation
of peace talks.
To the International Supporters of the IGAD Process, especially
the Observer Countries (U.S., UK, Norway and Italy), the UN, AU
and Arab League:
15. Intensify collective pressures on the Government of Sudan and
the SPLA to resolve the outstanding issues rapidly and sign a
comprehensive peace agreement before the end of 2004.
16. Encourage the Government of Sudan and the SPLA respectively,
once the negotiations on security arrangements for that
comprehensive peace agreement have been concluded and even before
final signature, to involve First Vice President Ali Osman Taha
and Chairman John Garang directly in the AU-facilitated
negotiations on Darfur.
To the IGAD and AU Mediators:
17. Establish close cooperation and take steps to coordinate
ideas on the overlap between the two peace processes, without
making progress on one dependent on the other.
18. Use the IGAD provisional agreements on the Nuba Mountains and
Southern Blue Nile as a starting point for work on the Darfur
negotiations.
Nairobi/Brussels, 23 August 2004
Prospects for peace in Sudan:
Justice Africa Briefing
August-September 2004
[brief excerpts only; for full briefing see
http://www.justiceafrica.org/bulletin.htm]
Overview
1. The GoS is pursuing the high-risk strategy of seeking a
solution on its own terms in Darfur, anticipating that
international interests in the Naivasha process will allow it to
prevail. It may yet be proven right. It has made only modest
progress in implementing its commitments in Darfur, focusing its
efforts on building an international coalition opposed to
sanctions. The practical obstacles to ensuring security are
considerable, but the GoS needs to demonstrate much more goodwill
and determination.
2. The Darfur peace process is making some progress in the
AU-convened talks at Abuja, Nigeria. It is clear that the
negotiations will take some time. The best options for immediate
progress include upgrading the AU military force in the region,
while refining the proposals for establishing security and moving
towards a comprehensive political settlement.
3. There are three parallel negotiating tracks at present.
Naivasha is currently in suspended animation, while the Abuja
talks progress. The NDA-GoS talks have resumed in Cairo under
Egyptian auspices. How can these initiatives be coordinated?
Should they be sequenced? The GoS is content for delays to
continue at Naivasha, as it wants to organise its core northern
constituencies before concluding deals with the SPLA and the
Darfur rebels. GoS hints about linking the peace processes are in
fact an indication that it prefers to slow them down.
4. The international community and many observers remain opposed
to such close linkages, preferring to emphasise the successful
completion of Naivasha without it being complicated by the Darfur
conflict. In fact there is no reason for delaying Naivashsa. Its
conclusion before the other tracks makes it the main reference to
any subsequent Agreements on Sudan.
...
9. The GoS was slow at drawing up its plan for controlling the
Janjawiid, presenting it to the Joint Implementation Mechanism
only on 19 August. This reflects the fact that a large proportion
of the Janjawiid, including its commanders, are part of the
command structure of the Sudanese armed forces and PDF, so that
disarming them while also maintaining the pretence that they are
an independent force represents political challenges.
The actions taken thus far for disarmament have been token only,
as alluded to by the UNSG's report. The well-documented attack on
26 August demonstrated the GoS failure to implement its
commitments. Was this an instance of contempt for the
international community? Or internal dissension within the ruling
clique? At the moment it is unclear, but it is probable that the
government has yet to decide on its plan of action. (In this
respect it is interesting to note that the GoS reported to the
JIM that some of the militias were indeed under its control, and
were associated with the PDF, thus contradicting its earlier
statements and explicitly opening up the agenda of disarming the
PDF itself.)
There is no sign of any efforts to prosecute Janjawiid leaders
allegedly responsible for abuses.
...
11. The UNSG's report concludes, fairly, that the GoS has not met
some of the commitments it entered into. This conclusion is
qualified by the report's acknowledgement of practical
difficulties in making progress, and efforts already made. The
challenge is now on the UNSC to find a means of maintaining or
intensifying pressure. There is an international consensus,
supported by most in Sudan, that sanctions are crude and
ineffective. The rebel movements are calling for a no-fly zone
over Darfur to prevent aerial attacks. But the key areas for
progress must be the parties' negotiation of a political
settlement, and the substantial upgrading of the African Union
military presence in Darfur.
Darfur: The Parties' Calculations
12. The GoS calculation is that the international community does
not have sufficient seriousness or staying power on the Darfur
issue, and that time is therefore on its side. It assumed that
with the support of the Arab League, the benefit of the doubt
from some prominent African states plus Russia and China, it
would evade sanctions at the UN Security Council. The GoS also
calculates that the U.S. and other western countries will not
risk derailing the Naivasha process over Darfur.
...
18. Both principals in Darfur have been counting on the SPLA. The
GoS assumes that the Naivasha process, whether completed or in
suspension, effectively neutralises the SPLA as an opposition.
The rebels have assumed that their contacts with the SPLM will
translate into political solidarity. However, neither side should
take the Southerners for granted. The GoS should not
underestimate the determination of the Southerners and the SPLM
not to be outmanoeuvred now or during the transitional period.
Neither should the Darfur rebels underestimate the Southerners'
commitment to peace in the South, and their resistance to
revisiting the North-South peace process and agreements reached
therein, on account of the Darfur conflict.
The SPLA position on Darfur, made clear by a statement by the
Chairman at New Site during the visit of Senator Bill Frist, is
that there should be a tripartite security force consisting of
GoS, SPLA and African Union forces (10,000 of each). This
proposal was rejected out of hand by the GoS. The SPLA is also
encouraging the Darfur rebels to study closely the Naivasha
agreements on the three areas. Clearly, the SPLA leadership is
becoming concerned that the Darfur conflict may delay the
completion of the Naivasha process.
Conclusions
41. Naivasha remains the linchpin of peace in Sudan. Without the
completion of Naivasha, all other peace processes are doomed to
failure. The completion of Naivasha will significantly change the
political dynamics in Khartoum and make a settlement of all other
outstanding issues and conflicts, beginning with Darfur, much
easier. In addition, many of the formulae agreed at Naivasha,
such as those for the three areas, can with suitable modification
be applied to Darfur and the Beja. For all these reasons, it is
important that the Naivasha process be rejuvenated and brought to
a rapid conclusion. The GoS should not be allowed to
procrastinate or be distracted by other concerns, however
legitimate they may be.
42. The outlines for a settlement in Darfur are in place. The
mediation process is beginning to function. The key issues have
been identified. The monitoring mechanisms have been identified,
even if the AU capacity is as yet inadequate. The key
international organisations are appraised of the issue. However,
there should be no illusions that this will be a rapid process.
The best that can reasonably be expected is a framework agreement
in the next two months or so, and the creation of a strong
secretariat on the Naivasha model, followed by negotiations on
the details and the implementation modalities, concurrent with an
upgraded and more assertive AU peace support operation (more
African troops with a more robust mandate), linked to sustained
political and diplomatic pressure by the international community.
The GoS, currently intransigent, is likely to see that conceding
a more effective AU presence is its least bad option.
AfricaFocus Bulletin is an independent electronic publication
providing reposted commentary and analysis on African issues,
with a particular focus on U.S. and international policies.
AfricaFocus Bulletin is edited by William Minter.
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