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Libya: Reflections, Zeleza
AfricaFocus Bulletin
Sep 19, 2011 (110919)
(Reposted from sources cited below)
Editor's Note
"That the West has always had a nefarious agenda in Africa
is not news--we all remember the slave trade, colonialism,
and structural adjustment. But we give the West too much
power when we absolve our dictators because the West likes
or detests them ... Our peoples' struggles and fundamental
interests for well-being and freedom should be our only
principled guide in supporting struggles for change. In
focusing on NATO's role in the Libyan campaign it is
tempting to underplay the role of the rebels themselves and
the struggles and desires of the majority of Libyan people
for freedom from Gadhafi's despotism." - PT Zeleza
As was the case for Tunisia and Egypt, there has been no
shortage of day-to-day news coverage (often contradictory)
and impassioned international policy debate on the Libyan
component of the Arab Awakening. But there has been much
less solid analysis, as the popular overthrow of Libya's
dictator has been complicated not only by the turn to armed
conflict but also by the decisive role played by NATO air
power and significant external assistance to the rebels,
primarily from France, Britain, and Qatar.
As the open military conflict at least appears to be in its
final stages, there is also no shortage of advice to the
new Libyan regime and speculation about its chances of
success. But there are still few systematic analyses of
what happened which carefully consider the internal
dynamics of Libya and the Arab world as well as the
significance of NATO intervention.
For previous AfricaFocus Bulletins on Libya, including a
fundamental historical analysis by Fred Halliday and
several Bulletins on issues related to migrants from subSaharan
Africa, see http://www.africafocus.org/country/libya.php
This series of AfricaFocus Bulletins on the significance of
recent events in Libya provides a selection of material
that I have found most useful, in three parts:
(1) a long commentary by historian and blogger PT Zeleza
(this one, distributed by e-mail and on the web at
http://www.africafocus.org/docs11/lib1109a.php) This is the
most nuanced broad analysis on the topic that I have seen.
(2) shorter commentaries by Mahmood Mamdani and Juan Cole
(on the web at http://www.africafocus.org/docs11/lib1109b.php) Mamdani
focuses on the consequences for other Africa countries.
Cole provides a sharp analysis of the myths invoked by many
critics of the international intervention.
and
(3) a compilation of links and brief excerpts of additional
articles, with short annotations/observations/questions by
the AfricaFocus editor (on the web at http://www.africafocus.org/docs11/lib1109c.php)
Suggestions from readers are welcome for links to key
analytical articles that might be added to this page.
++++++++++++++++++++++end editor's note+++++++++++++++++
The Fall of the Gadhafi Dictatorship: The Lessons for
Africa and the Arab World
By PTZeleza
Published on The Zeleza Post (http://www.zeleza.com)
First Written August 21, 2011, revised August 25, 2011
[For the embedded links to a wide range of sources, see the
original version of this blog post at http://tinyurl.com/44g8zj6]
After six months of protracted and ferocious fighting the
end for the regime of Moammar Gadhafi, the colorful,
eccentric, irascible, and ruthless tyrant of one of
Africa's most enduring dictatorships [1], finally came with
electrifying swiftness. In the last few days, the rebels
have made lightening advances as they seized one city after
another following months of setbacks and apparent
stagnation. As they stormed into Tripoli on Sunday, August
21, the long anticipated rebellion broke out in the capital
city, where about a third of Libyans live, which seemed to
fall without the widely feared bloodshed. Jubilant crowds
gathered in the Green Square, which was given its original
name, Martyr Square.
Ecstatic celebrations broke out in other cities including
Benghazi where the rebellion registered its first
triumphant victories and the National Transition Council is
based. The next few days were followed by some confusion
and continued fighting in Tripoli. At one time it was
announced two of Gadhafi's sons, who commanded some of the
forces of the crumbling regime, were captured, but a day
later one of the sons and Gadhafi's designated successor,
Saif al-Islam Gadhafi [2], appeared in public to rally his
father's diehard followers and battles raged in parts of
the city [3] including the heavily fortified Gadhafi
compound. A day later the compound, Bab al-Aziziya, fell
to the rebels, a moment of great historic symbolism, [4]
but Gadhafi was nowhere to be found and remained defiant
[5] and vowed to fight to the end [6].
At the time of writing, outbursts of fighting continue in
Tripoli as the rebels try to consolidate their gains,
establish a government, and unblock frozen Libyan funds
[7]. While the rebels cannot yet declare complete victory
as long as sporadic fighting continues in Tripoli and other
strongholds of the regime and Gadhafi remains on the loose,
there can be little question that the curtain has closed on
his 42-year rule and he will soon join the dictators' hall
of infamy where his recently deposed neighbors, Zine El
Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia and Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, the
first culprits of the "Arab Spring" reside, and where other
leaders such as Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe [8] ought to join
soon.
The scenes and sounds of euphoria we have witnessed in
Tripoli and other Libyan cities have an intoxicating
familiarity to them. We have seen such images before, most
recently in Tunisia and Egypt, and before that in the 1990s
and 2000s in many capitals across the continent as the
winds of the "second independence" shook several entrenched
dictatorship from power. But sooner or later the excitement
will dissipate in the unpredictable maelstrom of
transition. Overthrowing a dictatorship is only the
beginning in the arduous process of political
reconstruction. The record of such transitions in the rest
of Africa including the recent cases of Tunisia and Egypt
serves as a cautionary tale that this is a process
characterized by fitful progress, often littered with
setbacks and disappointments.
The transition in Libya will be particularly complicated
because of the manner in which the Gadhafi regime fell and
the composition of the forces that brought this about. The
collapse of the Gadhafi regime combines three elements that
are unusual in their coalescence in the current conjuncture
of tumultuous political change in Africa: armed struggle,
popular uprising, and international intervention. In
postcolonial Africa we are familiar with changes of regime
that came about through armed struggle. An early example
includes the seizure of power by the rebel forces led by
Yoweri Museveni in Uganda in 1986. Popular rebellions and
struggles have brought down numerous governments since the
onset of Africa's current democratic wave that began two
decades ago--Tunisia and Egypt are the latest examples.
The fall of the Gadhafi regime has involved both armed
struggle and popular uprising. This recalls Africa's
struggles for the "first independence" from colonialism
rather than the struggles for the "second independence"
from postcolonial authoritarianism. The closest and most
recent parallel can be seen in the end of apartheid in
South Africa. The obvious difference is that the South
African liberation movement did not seize power by
defeating the apartheid army. It succeeded in making the
country ungovernable and forcing a negotiated settlement.
This might explain the post-apartheid South African
government's preference, indeed obsession, sometimes
misguided, with negotiated settlements from Zimbabwe to
Cote d'Ivoire and Libya.
Africa also has a long history of external interventions in
which international and local forces collude in the
overthrow of governments. The fall of Patrice Lumumba's
regime in the Congo in 1960 and Kwame Nkrumah's in Ghana in
1966 enjoys particular notoriety in progressive African
circles. On the flip side, there is Cuba's highly regarded
intervention in Angola that saved the MPLA regime and
humbled the regional military might of apartheid South
Africa and accelerated the demise of its hold over Namibia
and brought closer the winds of liberation to the apartheid
laager itself. Most recently, there was the limited French
intervention in Cote d'Ivoire against the obdurate regime
of Laurent Gbagbo, who refused to accept electoral defeat.
The scale of international military intervention in the
fall of the Gadhafi regime is unprecedented in Africa's
recent struggles for the "second independence." There can
be little doubt the victory of the rebels was facilitated
by NATO, which provided air cover and helped degrade the
Gadhafi military machine and enabled the rebels to advance
on the ground. The NATO intervention was sanctioned by two
UN Security Council resolutions. Resolution 1970 [9]
"demanded an end to the violence and decided to refer the
situation to the International Criminal Court while
imposing an arms embargo on the country and a travel ban
and assets freeze on the family of Muammar Al-Qadhafi and
certain Government officials." Resolution 1973 [10]
"imposed a ban on all flights in the country's airspace - a
no-fly zone - and tightened sanctions on the Qadhafi regime
and its supporters."
However, subsequently NATO's intervention attracted
widespread criticism. Western detractors accused NATO of
violating [11] the UN resolutions, scuttling a peaceful
resolution, and perpetrating a cycle of violence that will
haunt post-Gadhafi Libya. Many called attention to its high
cost, the dangers of mission cluelessness [12], mission
creep [13], or mission creak [14], of reproducing the
quagmire of Iraq and Afghanistan [15], and worsening the
plight of the Libyan civilians [16]. It represented, in one
writer's words, imperial hijacking [17] and posed a major
threat to the Arab revolution. "The west's approach to
Libya [is] self-deluding, hypocritical and is proving to be
counterproductive," another commentator railed [18]. In the
United States, the Obama Administration was either accused
of failing to take decisive action to avoid stalemate [19],
or failing to get Congressional consent [20] thereby making
the war illegal [21].
Some of the strongest criticism against NATO's so-called
"humanitarian mission" in Libya has come from African
governments, politicians, and commentators. They accuse
NATO of committing a war of aggression against an African
state [22] and undermining peacemaking efforts by the
African Union [23]. Many believe NATO's "invasion of
Libya," in the words of one commentator [24], "has little
to do with protecting civilians and all to do with
strategic interests" especially the country's vast oil
resources [25]. To some the West has always had it for
Gahdhafi for being a revolutionary and radical PanAfricanist
[26]. He is being punished for his "long-term
'insubordination' to western imperialism." [27] One scholar
vehemently condemns the three African countries [28],
Gabon, Nigeria and South Africa that voted for the UN
resolution and questions the suitability of Nigeria and
South Africa on this account to represent Africa as
permanent members on the UN Security Council should Council
membership ever be reformed.
Interestingly, Nigeria and South Africa have since taken
different positions on the fall of the Gadhafi regime. A
day after the rebels seized much of Tripoli, Nigeria
announced its recognition [28] of the rebel National
Transition Council as the "legitimate representative of the
Libyan people." This drew flak from South Africa [29] which
accused Nigeria of "jumping the gun in recognizing the
rebels as representatives of Libya" in opposition to the
current position of the African Union. South Africa
initially blocked efforts by Britain and France to pass a
UN resolution to unfreeze Libyan assets [30] and only
agreed to allow the release of $1.5bn in frozen Libyan
funds for humanitarian aid and other civilian needs when
the NTC was formally removed from the request [31]. South
Africa expressed strong resentment against NATO's [32]
overreach and breach of the UN resolution, which it sees as
"the latest example of Africa being shown a lack of respect
by the rest of the world."
South Africa's original endorsement of the UN resolution
elicited strong opposition in some radical political
circles within the country; now there is growing domestic
and international consternation and criticism against the
government's reluctance to recognize the Libyan rebels. In
the words of the renowned South African commentator,
Alistair Sparks [33], "It strikes me as absolutely absurd
that while people are dancing in the streets celebrating
freedom, South Africa is resisting that. South Africa owes
a lot of its freedom to foreign intervention, including the
west. We end up on the wrong side, the side of tyrants."
There are many other African commentators who have found
the support for Gadhafi against the armed rebellion quite
troubling. Human rights activists have been particularly
adamant. Civil society organizations [34] across the
continent urged African "governments to protect the people
of Libya against whom crimes against humanity are being
committed by a vicious regime." In the words of one
journalist [35], "Few would deny that Libya's lifetime
president, Muammar Gaddafi, is the perfect caricature of a
'third world' dictator. In usual form, Gaddafi's regime was
politically and economically sustained by the obvious
global actors: Corporations and 'first world' regimes, keen
to access geostrategically convenient gas supplies" and
notes how this neo-colonial dependency sustains the
inequities of Libya's political economy. Yash Tandon, [36]
the Ugandan political activist and public intellectual has
tried to distinguish between Gadhafi being objectively a
"neo-colonial dictator" and subjectively an "antiimperialist."
The veteran Ghanaian journalist, Cameron Duodu [37] brooks
no such sophistries. He laments, "I found it amazing that
on some Internet forums, many of my fellow Africans who,
one suspects, set a great deal of store by freedom and
democracy in their own countries, and who would be the
first to protest if their governments showed any signs of
repressing them, were supporting Gaddafi." He proceeded to
argue that Gadhafi had long shed any anti-Western,
revolutionary, or progressive credentials he may have once
had in his despicable self-deification and relentless
terror against his own people. Horace Campbell [38] also
contends "a close examination of the political economy and
cultural practices of Gaddafi would show that far from
being anti-imperialist, he was like a semi-feudal leader.
Gaddafi used Libyan people's money to try to harness the
reservoir of traditional rulers and buy over leaders from
across the continent in order to gain support for his
aspiration to become the despotic king of kings of Africa."
These commentators poignantly capture a common weakness in
African political discourse, the troubling tendency to
excuse African dictators on account of their tattered
histories of anti-western or anti-imperialist rhetoric.
That the West has always had a nefarious agenda in Africa
is not news--we all remember the slave trade, colonialism,
and structural adjustment. But we give the West too much
power when we absolve our dictators because the West likes
or detests them, when we sacrifice our peoples' rights to
democracy and development on the altar of Western interests
and rhetoric. Our peoples' struggles and fundamental
interests for well-being and freedom should be our only
principled guide in supporting struggles for change.
In focusing on NATO's role in the Libyan campaign it is
tempting to underplay the role of the rebels themselves and
the struggles and desires of the majority of Libyan people
for freedom from Gadhafi's despotism. In fact, rather than
regard this as a victory for NATO, one commentator contends
[39] "Libya may have demonstrated that the days of
conclusive, concerted, action by large military alliances
is well and truly over."
Whatever one's views about the Gadhafi regime, it is clear
that its ouster through an armed rebellion, popular
uprising, and international military intervention will
profoundly affect the political trajectory of post-Gadhafi
Libya making it exceptionally complicated and contentious.
The Western powers will seek to exact their pound of flesh,
to reap the spoils of war [40] and try to turn Libya into
an even more pliant neocolonial outpost. Clearly, the
national legitimacy and regional and international
credibility of the National Transition Council will depend
to a large extent on its ability to break its dependency
[41] on the western powers that have bankrolled NATO's
intervention.
The composition and inclusiveness of the NTC is also a
critical issue. The Council is a loose coalition of
recycled members of the political class, the functionaries
of the Gadhafi dictatorship who belatedly saw the political
light and defected to the opposition, long-term opponents
of the regime both domestic and from the diaspora, and
ordinary people and activists tired of the dictatorship and
invigorated by the uprising. Mahmood Mamdani [42] has
argued the anti-Gaddafi coalition comprises different
political trends including what he "radical Islamists,
royalists, tribalists, and secular middle class activists
produced by a Western-oriented educational system."
Pundits in the American media seem to worry most about the
divisive specter of the "Islamists" and "tribalism" over
the new Libya. The uprisings in Libya, like those in
Tunisia [43] and Egypt, were not inspired or led by radical
Islamists. In Egypt the Muslim Brotherhood [43], which has
sought to moderate its image [44] and bolster its
democratic credentials has gained political ground [45],
although it seems to be fracturing under the strain [46] of
the new political order. The same is true in Tunisia where
the once-banned Islamist Ennahda Party, which has sought to
champion its tolerance and moderation [47], has re-emerged
as a political force [48].
The question of ethnic and clan divisions cannot be
discounted, although as is widely known in African studies
the term "tribe" is an analytical canard [49] often imposed
on complex African phenomena, processes, and problems by
careless and uninformed western journalists and academics.
The way these divisions are managed within the opposition
movement will help determine the patterns and possibilities
of transformation. What passes for ethnic divisions in
African countries are often highly complex and intersected
spatial, social, ideological, and religious divides. In
Libya, spatially there is the split between eastern and
western parts of the country as well as the coastal and
southern regions. Hierarchies of social class are no less
important in the beleaguered country's political economy
and they can be expected to throw their weight on the
transition. Ideological schisms cannot be discounted
either.
The collapse of the Gadhafi regime will have a profound
impact on its neighbors and the wider region. Likely to
change is Libya's relationship with the rest of the
continent. The days of the Libyan government bankrolling
Gadhafi's self-serving causes and clients in the name of
Pan-Africanism or radicalism will likely disappear with the
ousted dictator. The alleged use of mercenaries from subSaharan
Africa and the characteristically ineffectual
diplomacy of the African Union might add to the souring of
Libya's relations with its neighbors to the South. The new
Libyan government will remember that the Arab League
recognized them earlier than the African Union and they are
unlikely to continue footing 15% of the AU's budget [50] as
the Gadhafi regime did. This might explain the reluctance
of the AU to abandon Gadhafi thereby biting the hand that
has fed it for so long.
An intriguing question is whether this means Libya will
become more Arab than African. Charles Onyango-Obbo [51],
the Executive Editor of the Daily Nation in Nairobi offers
a fascinating take. He argues that the North African
revolutions including Libya's may actually lead to the
dissolution of the mythical boundary between North Africa
and Sub-Saharan Africa, in which "most discussions about
democracy in Africa always excluded the Arab North as a
matter of course, because it was assumed that Arabs were
incapable of democracy.... Now we know that this is not
true. African Arabs want democracy, and are willing to die
for it, as much as African Africans (does something like
that exist?)." This might entail a political remapping of
Africa. "We shall have a new map in which the most
democratic and wealthy nations in Africa are the bottom of
the continent (South Africa, Botswana, Mauritius, Cape
Verde, Zambia), and its tip (Tunisia, Egypt. Libya). The
poor and repressive ones will be clustered in the middle.
Sub-Sahara Africa as a political and economic concept will
make less sense, and new classifications will have to be
found."
Also likely is that the faltering energies of the Arab
Spring and struggles against authoritarianism across Africa
and the Middle East will be renewed. The fall of the
Gadhafi regime brings back into the equation, it
legitimizes, armed rebellion as an important part of the
struggle for regime change and political transformation.
The case of Libya has clearly demonstrated the limits of
popular uprisings and peaceful protest against recalcitrant
dictatorships. This should serve as a warning to other
African and Arab dictators who continue to frustrate
peaceful demands for freedom and democracy. The people of
Libya have shown change will come sooner or later by fusing
popular uprising with armed rebellions in the age-old
tradition of anti-colonial liberation struggles even if
aided by hypocritical imperialist western powers for their
own disreputable interests. The real challenge is for the
Libyan people to rebuild their country in pursuit of the
age-old triple dreams of the African nationalist project:
democracy, development, and self-determination.
AfricaFocus Bulletin is an independent electronic
publication providing reposted commentary and analysis on
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international policies. AfricaFocus Bulletin is edited by
William Minter.
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