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USA/Africa: Rising Pressures for Militarization
AfricaFocus Bulletin
Jun 1, 2012 (120601)
(Reposted from sources cited below)
Editor's Note
"The committee believes that activities that utilize U.S.
Special Operations Forces and an 'indirect approach' that
leverages local and indigenous forces should be used more
aggressively and surgically in Africa and the Arabian
Peninsula in close coordination with and in support of
geographic combatant commander and U.S. embassy country team
requirements. The committee believes that current indirect
activities are not fully resourced and underutilized to
counter gains and preclude the expansion of Al Qaeda
affiliates in these regions." - Report of the House of
Representatives Armed Services Committee on the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013
As noted in the report from the Republican-majority House of
Representatives cited above, there are increasing political
pressures for the United States to double down on its
military involvement in Africa, particularly in terms of
counter-terrosism action against affiliates of al-Qaida. The
committee report also includes some moderating nuances,
counseling against an over-emphasis on "kinetic" (combat)
action and on cooperation with African governments. But it
also represents pressure both from Congress and within the
administration for a more militarized approach.
This is reinforced on the parallel front of "humanitarian
intervention" by public opinion fueled by Invisible
Children's "Kony2012" campaign, with pressure for providing
more resources to the U.S. military support for the antiKony
campaign.
Probably the most dangerous policy proposal now being urged
on the administration is formal designation of Boko Haram in
Nigeria as a "Foreign Terrorist Organization." As explained
below, such a designation would impede more comprehensive
and nuanced efforts to combat the organization and severely
restrict public and private U.S. engagement in humanitarian
and peace building activities in Nigeria, as has been the
case with al Shabaab in Somalia. In addition, as also in
Somalia, it poses a threat to the transmission of
remittances from the United States, funds which are critical
both for the welfare of families and for development.
This AfricaFocus Bulletin contains a letter from U.S.
scholars to Secretary of State Clinton calling for the
United States government NOT to declare Boko Haram a foreign
terrorist organization, as well as additional commentary on
the issue by Carl LeVan, one of the initiators of the
letter. The Bulletin also includes excerpts from the Report
of the House of Representatives Armed Services Committee on
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2013, as well as brief notes on other recent congressional
actions.
For previous AfricaFocus Bulletins on peace and security
issues, visit http://www.africafocus.org/peaceexp.php For
AfricaFocus Bulletins on the United States and Africa, visit
http://www.africafocus.org/country/usa-africa.php
Update
The article "Do No Harm: assessing a military approach to
the Lord's Resistance Army," by Ronald R. Atkinson, Phil
Lancaster, Ledio Cakaj, & Guilaume Lacaille, is now
available for free download at:
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17531055.2012.669591
Update June 15, 2012
The Friends Committee on National Legislation (FCNL) is
calling for organizational endorsement, from U.S. or
African groups, of a letter to the
U.S. Senate calling for greater oversight and restraint in
U.S. military operations in Africa, in contrast to the
legislation currently before Congress which calls for
intensified military involvement.
To add your organizational endorsement, send a message
to Cassidy Regan at
cassidy@fcnl.org
The text of the letter is below.
June 20, 2012
Dear Senator X,
We write to urge you to resist the growing militarization of
U.S. aid and policy toward Africa. Recent appropriations and
policies reflect an increasing focus on both regional and
bilateral military operations and assistance. In
anticipation of the FY 2013 National Defense Authorization
Act (NDAA) reaching the Senate floor, we ask that you oppose
this detrimental approach that threatens to undermine
African efforts toward stability and long-term peace.
In the House Armed Services Committee’s recent report on the
NDAA, the following language called directly for more
“aggressive” and “surgical” operations on the African
continent:
“Specifically, the committee believes that activities that
utilize U.S. Special Operations Forces and an ‘indirect
approach’ that leverages local and indigenous forces should
be used more aggressively and surgically in Africa...”
Section 1203 of the Senate Armed Services Committee’s NDAA
echoes this approach, appropriating funding to train and
equip security forces for counterterrorism purposes in
Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti and countries participating in the
African Union Mission in Somalia. While a recent article in
the New York Times cited a failed attempt by the military’s
Special Operations Command to gain additional authority, it
also noted that funding streams – such as the Global
Security Contingency Fund – already exist to support these
operations. Most disturbingly, last week’s Washington Post
article on the subject revealed widening covert intelligence
and targeted assassination operations in Africa, as well as
deeply concerning reports of airstrikes, raids and drone use
in Somalia specifically.
Though such initiatives are presented as being in the
interest of U.S. national security, “aggressive” operations
in Africa and elsewhere instead have a history of resulting
in exacerbated instability, increased threat to civilian
safety and further radicalization. Training and equipment
programs have also been criticized in the past for lack of
clear accountability and minimal evaluation of impact on
related conflicts and communities. In light of these and
other concerns, we urge you to:
-
At the minimum, press for greater evaluation and oversight
of current military and counterterrorism assistance to
African countries, ensuring that U.S. aid does not serve to
worsen security conditions and enable human rights
violations. A comprehensive accounting of current U.S.
military and counterterrorism assistance to African
countries is impossible to find, while language encouraging
additional funding for special operations only increases.
According to a report by the Congressional Research Service,
members of Congress have noted that, “the U.S. government
may not be adequately assessing long-term risks associated
with providing training and military equipment for
counterterrorism purposes to countries with poor records of
human rights, rule of law, and accountability.” Further
negative consequences include the potential diversion of
equipment into illicit markets – a major concern given that
arms trafficking is already a significant threat to many
African countries. As the NDAA and appropriations processes
move forward, we urge you to ensure vigilant oversight of
any U.S. military and counterterrorism assistance, as well
as to halt this aid in the event of human rights abuses,
exacerbated humanitarian security or destabilization of the
region in question.
-
Reverse the trend of increasing focus on U.S.
counterterrorism and military operations and assistance that
threaten civilian safety and undermine long-term peace.
Foreign policy experts worldwide have raised concerns
around the destabilizing impact of U.S. special military
and counterterrorism operations and targeted assassinations
in places including Pakistan, Yemen and East Africa, citing
consequences including significant civilian casualties and
an increase in retaliatory attacks. This growing emphasis
not only poses immediate danger, but also serves to
overshadow and undermine support for the peacebuilding and
other civilian-led programs that promote stability in the
long-term.
One example of this disturbing dynamic arises with regard to
U.S. policy toward Kenya, where there is dire need for
locally-led violence prevention and peacebuilding in
anticipation of the next national elections in March of
2013. While this year’s State and Foreign Operations budget
request includes only a few references to support for
Kenya’s work toward peace and reconciliation, it frequently
mentions Kenya with regard to various counterterrorism and
military accounts. Meanwhile, capacities including the
Complex Crises Fund and the Bureau of Conflict and
Stabilization Operations, whose initiatives aim to help
prevent a return to the electoral crisis of 2007-8, have
faced significant cuts in the House. In Kenya and elsewhere,
U.S. military operations and assistance have begun to
overshadow and undermine the important efforts undertaken by
civilian agencies and African groups toward economic
empowerment, justice and violence prevention. We urge you to
reject language in support of and funding requests intended
for military operations in Africa – including section 1203 –
and instead place emphasis on supporting Africans’ work to
address root causes of violence and promote peaceful, just
solutions.
While we ultimately advocate for an end to all military
operations and related assistance, we urge you to take the
steps above to immediately confront this worrying trend.
Rather than serving to undermine African efforts, we hope
that U.S. policy will demonstrate commitment to the long-
term peace that is in line with U.S. strategic concerns.
Sincerely,
++++++++++++++++++++++end editor's note+++++++++++++++++
Letter to Secretary Clinton from Nigeria Scholars
US Profs to Clinton: Respond to Boko Haram with Diplomacy,
Development, and Demilitarization
May 21, 2012
http://carllevan.com/2012/05/ / direct URL:
http://tinyurl.com/bme578j
Twenty-one scholars with expertise on Nigeria sent a letter
to Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton today on Boko
Haram. The letter begins by noting the "horrific violence"
perpetrated against civilians and government officials, but
argues that responding to Boko Haram ultimately requires a
"diplomatic, developmental, and demilitarized framework."
(see full text of letter below).
Nigeria's National Security Advisor is visiting Washington,
D.C. this week, and Secretary Clinton has been under
pressure from Republicans in the House of Representatives to
formally designate Boko Haram a Foreign Terrorist
Organization (FTO). The Department of Justice's National
Security Division wrote a letter to Clinton in January, also
urging her to make the designation.
The US-based academics, however, argue that formally
labeling Boko Haram an FTO would "limit American policy
options to those least likely to work." In particular, it
would:
(1) Internationalize Boko Haram's standing and enhance its
status among radical organizations elsewhere. A report by
Homeland Security Committee in the U.S. House of
Representatives in November was entitled, "Boko Haram:
Emerging Threat to the US Homeland," and John Brennan, the
Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and
Counterterrorism, said in a speech at the Woodrow Wilson
Center on April 30 that Boko Haram "appears to be aligning
itself with al-Qaida's violent agenda and is increasingly
looking to attack Western interests in Nigeria, in addition
to Nigerian government targets." Many scholars however
suggest that despite claims by members of the group, and
some alleged contact with terrorist organizations outside
Nigeria, Boko Haram overwhelmingly remains a domestic
problem.
(2) Give disproportionate attention to counter-terrorism in
bilateral relations at a time when economic ties are
expanding and a robust multi-faceted relationship has
emerged. Last month the U.S. Special Operations Command
organized a three day conference on Boko Haram, which
entailed a detailed discussion about possible next steps.
Some government civilians saw this as an effort to make
policy - rather than simply implement it. This was a marked
contrast with comments by AFRICOM four years ago, when it
repeatedly reassured its critics that it would "stay in its
lane." The signers of the letter argue, "The State
Department and its civilian developmental partners must be
in the lead" on Nigeria policy.
(3) Undermine Nigeria's progress on the rule of law in two
ways: First, by effectively legitimizing abuses by security
services that Human Rights Watch and other organizations
have drawn attention to as urgent, ongoing problems. This
issue is especially important because the extrajudicial
killing of Boko Haram's captured leader by the police in
2009 was immediately followed by an expansion of violence,
radicalization, and fragmentation of Boko Haram. Second,
President Goodluck Jonathan is pushing the National Assembly
for Martial Law. Historically, such measures have been
followed by broader political instability. It would give
the military an expanded role in law enforcement in a
country with a deep history of authoritarianism. Moreover,
given the contentious nature of Jonathan's ascent to power
in 2010, and his election in 2011 despite the informal PDP
understanding that it was the North's "turn" to rule,
additional executive latitude would likely be interpreted as
a desperate attempt by a southerner to hold on to power.
(4) Impede humanitarian assistance and possibly independent
academic research. The scholars note that the national
security list system has created a "cumbersome and arbitrary
process" that has interfered with humanitarian work in
Africa. The Charity and Security Network has documented how
provisions of the Patriot Act prevented humanitarian
assistance from reaching hungry people during last summer's
famine in east Africa, for example. In a new report
entitled "Deadly Combination: Disaster Conflict and the U.S.
Material Support Law,"
(http://charityandsecurity.org/deadlycombination) CSN notes
that once an organization is listed as an FTO, the US
Treasury Department explicitly prohibits "any transactions"
with listed groups or other entities described as their
supporters.
For this reason, the academics in the letter raise the
concern that the FTO's broad legal regime could also impact
their ability to conduct independent scholarly inquiry.
An excellent report from the Center for American Progress
summarizes the legal consequences of an FTO designation, and
points out how numerous terrorist organizations are not
designated as such because of the cumbersome problems that
it generates for humanitarianism and balanced inter-agency
policy making. http://www.americanprogress.org (direct URL:
http://tinyurl.com/c8cpjrf).
The FTO designation would likely have devastating effects on
remittances from Nigerian-Americans. According to the World
Bank, Nigeria was the highest recipient of remittance flows
to Africa in 2011. It received an estimated $10.6 billion,
amounting to 4.5% of Nigeria's GDP. Thousands of NigerianAmericans
would therefore fear prosecution for sending money
home. And at a time when the US is trying to demonstrate
its goodwill in the north, families there in particular
would face additional burdens and hardships. To see a chart
prepared by the Migration Policy Institute tracking
Nigeria's remittances over time, go to
http://migrationinformation.org/datahub/remittances/Nigeria.pdf
I was one of the letter's initiators, along with Peter Lewis
from SAIS and Jean Herskovits from SUNY - Purchase. I will
be giving a brief talk on Boko Haram at a conference
sponsored by the Jamestown Foundation at the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace on Tuesday, June 19, in
Washington, DC. I hope to see some of you there.
May 21, 2012
Hillary Rodham Clinton
Secretary of State
U.S. Department of State
2201 C Street NW
Washington, DC 20520
Dear Secretary Clinton:
As scholars with a special interest in Nigeria and broad
expertise on African politics, we are writing to urge that
you not designate Boko Haram a Foreign Terrorist
Organization (FTO). We are acutely aware of the horrific
violence perpetrated by Boko Haram, including attacks on
both Muslims and Christians in Nigeria, whether government
officials or civilian targets. We share your concerns about
the impact of extremist violence on Nigeria's democratic
progress and security in general. However an FTO
designation would internationalize Boko Haram, legitimize
abuses by Nigeria's security services, limit the State
Department's latitude in shaping a long term strategy, and
undermine the U.S. Government's ability to receive effective
independent analysis from the region.
An FTO designation would internationalize Boko Haram's
standing and enhance its status among radical organizations
elsewhere. Boko Haram's recent tactics, including the use
of suicide bombers and improvised explosive devices, raise
questions about their foreign links. The network's focus has
been overwhelmingly domestic, despite an August 2011 attack
on the United Nations office in Abuja. Rhetorically, some of
Boko Haram's critique of northern underdevelopment and elite
corruption is within the realm of mainstream political
discourse. But there are clear indications that their
tactics and targets have turned most Nigerians against them,
including local populations in the north. An FTO
designation would potentially shift the organization's
posture towards the US and validate the more radical
factions' analysis of outsider influence in Nigeria. It
would also undermine the Nigerian government's ability to
address the
problem through law enforcement and thereby improve rule of
law.
An FTO designation would give disproportionate attention to
counter-terrorism in our bilateral relations, and increase
the risk that the US becomes linked - whether in reality or
perception - to abuses by the security services. An FTO
designation would effectively endorse excessive use of force
at a time when the rule of law in Nigeria hangs in the
balance. There is already evidence that abuses by Nigeria's
security services have facilitated radical recruitment.
This was made unequivocally clear in 2009 following the
extrajudicial murder of Mohammed Yusuf, which was
broadcast across the internet. That incident was
immediately followed by Boko Haram's radicalization,
splintering, and increased propensity for large scale
violence. Moreover, the routine use of the military for domestic law enforcement is
a cause for alarm in a country with a deep history of
military rule, and where formal declarations of states of
emergency have historically led to broader political instability.
In publicizing this letter, it is also our hope that the
Department of Defense and other concerned agencies will
reaffirm the limitations of their roles: informing or
implementing policy rather than making it. Accurately
understanding and properly addressing the issue of Boko
Haram will require a diplomatic, developmental, and
demilitarized framework. The State Department and its
civilian developmental partners must be in the lead.
The FTO list system has its origins in Executive Order 12947
in 1995, which was designed to prohibit transactions with
organizations that interfere in the Middle East peace
process. Congressional legislation the following year codified a
process for making such decisions under the Effective Death
Penalty and Anti-Terrorism Act. Once the State Department
makes an FTO designation and that entity is added to the Specially
Designated Nationals (SDN) list managed by the Treasury
Department, it is illegal for U.S. citizens to have any
interactions with that entity unless they apply for a
license. At least 1.1 million individuals and entities are
also on secret lists, according to an audit by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation's Inspector General. Lack of
information about the criteria for being listed makes it
impossible to be removed and encourages selective
enforcement.
This cumbersome and arbitrary process has made it impossible
for some humanitarian organizations to operate in the
neediest areas of Africa. If economic development is to play
a role in alleviating tensions in northern Nigeria, we
should not hamper access by USAID or private NGOs in
providing aid and assistance in the region.
Should Boko Haram be designated an FTO through this regime,
it would be illegal for nongovernmental organizations to
interact with members of Boko Haram - even if the purpose of
such contact was to persuade them to renounce violence. The
US Supreme Court upheld these restrictions in 2010,
declaring that such contact would constitute providing
"material support" to terrorist groups. Commenting on the
threat this poses to the Carter Center, former U.S.
President Jimmy Carter said this legal restriction
"threatens our work and the work of many other peacemaking
organizations that must interact directly with groups that
have engaged in violence." It would therefore be illegal for
third party intermediaries to play a role in some future
peace process or in the confidence building measures
required to get there.
Less attention has been brought to the damage that this
system does to academic inquiry more generally. An FTO
designation would prevent independent scholarly inquiry
about Boko Haram, and increase suspicion in the future about
researchers with no governmental ties. Public policy
benefits from dialogue with public scholars, and an FTO
designation would effectively criminalize broad categories of research.
During a visit to Nigeria in February, former president Bill
Clinton commented on the security crisis there by concluding
that "it is almost impossible to cure a problem based on
violence with violence." A lasting solution to Boko Haram will require
robust political and developmental components initiated by
the Nigerian government and broadly endorsed by the Nigerian
people through democratic processes that enhance the rule of law.
We believe that an FTO designation for Boko Haram would
limit American policy options to those least likely to work,
and would undermine the domestic political conditions necessary in
Nigeria for an enduring solution.
We thank you for taking our views into consideration. Our
affiliations are listed for identification purposes only and
do not constitute an institutional endorsement.
Sincerely,
Carl LeVan, American University; Peter M. Lewis, Johns
Hopkins University; Jean Herskovits, SUNY - Purchase;
Daniel J. Smith, Brown University; Adrienne LeBas,
American University; R. Kiki Edozie, Michigan State
University; Brandon Kendhammer, Ohio University; Susan
Shepler, American University; John Campbell, Council on
Foreign Relations; David Dwyer, Michigan State University;
Paul Lubeck, University of California - Santa Cruz; Pearl
Robinson, Tufts University; Darren Kew, University of
Massachusetts - Boston; Clarence Lusane, American University; Laura Thaut, University of Minnesota - Minneapolis; Nicolas
van de Walle, Cornell University; Judith Byfield, Cornell
University; Susan M. O'Brien, University of Florida; John
Paden, George Mason University; Deborah Brautigam, Johns
Hopkins University; Michael Watts, University of California - Berkeley
Additional names added since May 21: David Laitin, Stanford
University; David Wiley, Michigan State University; Shobana
Shankar, Georgetown University
cc: Johnnie Carson, Assistant Secretary of State for African
Affairs
Report of the House of
Representatives Armed Services Committee on the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013
For commentary see
http://fcnl.org/blog/2c/NDAA2013_Africa_Language/
For full text see
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/T?&report=hr479&dbname=112&
{Excerpts related to Africa below]
Counter Lord's Resistance Army and Related Operations
The committee notes the efforts of the Department of Defense
and U.S. Africa Command, consistent with the Lord's
Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act
of 2009 (Public Law 111-172), to assist the Ugandan People's
Defense Force as they combat the Lord's Resistance Army
(LRA) and attempt to bring Joseph Kony to justice. The
deployment of approximately 100 United States special
operations forces in support of this mission is a step in
addressing a two decade reign of terror that has killed and
brutalized thousands while destabilizing the region. The
committee notes that Congress has provided the authority in
section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112-81) to support this effort
and commends it to the attention of the Secretary of
Defense. However, the committee also cautions that special
operations forces should be employed judiciously and within
circumstances that fully leverage the unique skill sets that
these highly trained units possess, in keeping with
important U.S. national security interests.
The committee believes that stability in Africa is in the
United States' national interest. Supporting justice, human
rights, and poverty reduction, as well as facilitating
access of African goods and services to world markets,
brings a stability that stretches beyond just the local
region and has a positive impact upon the United States and
our global partners. Therefore, the committee encourages the
Administration to continue its interagency approach to
stabilization efforts and security sector reform programs
across the region, including the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, the Central African Republic, and South Sudan, among
others. In so doing, the Administration should consider
using the authorities granted by the Global Security
Contingency Fund, which was crafted for this sort of multifaceted
security challenge. The committee notes that the
Administration has used the Global Train and Equip authority
(i.e. '1206') for this purpose but cautions that this was a
special case use of that authority. Generally, the intent of
'1206' in the counter-terrorism role is to combat terrorist
organizations with a global reach and an agenda that is
directly hostile to the United States and our partners. The
LRA, while a heinous entity, does not necessarily rise to
that standard on its own.
Counterterrorism Policy and the Growing Threat of al Qaeda
Regional Affiliates
The committee is concerned about the spread of Al Qaeda
regional affiliates and the lack of a comprehensive
counterterrorism strategy to mitigate these threats. The
committee has previously expressed concern in this area,
most recently in section 1032 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112-81).
The committee notes that the February 2012 U.S. Intelligence
Community Worldwide Threat Assessment depicted a core Al
Qaeda (AQ) with diminished operational importance and a more
decentralized leadership movement. The assessment further
noted that continued robust U.S. and partnered
counterterrorism (CT) efforts and pressure would likely lead
to fragmentation of the movement within a few years.
While core AQ is diminishing in operational importance, the
committee is concerned that regional Al Qaeda affiliates,
particularly in Africa and the Arabian Peninsula, continue
to increase attacks both locally and globally, expand
ideological influence, and gain territorial control in
strategic areas of concern. Additionally, several senior
national security officials have identified Al Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in the Republic of Yemen as the
most serious terrorist threat to the United States. The
committee notes that AQAP continues to exploit local
political instability and expand local influence,
particularly in the southern provinces. While remaining an
international threat, AQAP has expanded domestic operations
within Yemen to launch a wide-scale domestic insurgency,
thereby transforming the organization from an Al Qaeda
affiliate to a Taliban-like movement further threatening the
region. The committee notes that such gains provide AQAP
with greater freedom to move, plan, and project threats
regionally and internationally.
Similarly, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) continues
operations in northern Africa and the U.S. intelligence
community has noted that AQIM is seeking opportunities to
strike Western targets. The committee is concerned that
post-coup political instability in the Republic of Mali
presents another regional point of vulnerability given the
concentration of AQIM members in Mali's northern desert.
There are also fears that the Islamic extremist group Boko
Haram in the Federal Republic of Nigeria has engaged with
elements of AQIM, suggesting a wider regional trend of
shared tactics and resources threatening security and
stability throughout the region.
Additionally, Al Shabaab in Somalia recently announced a
public merger with core AQ. Al Shabaab grew out of a
nationalist movement within Somalia to repel what was viewed
by Al Shabaab as Ethiopian troops occupying Somali lands.
However, with the help of AQ leaders such as the recently
deceased AQ operative, Huran Fazul, Al Shabaab has
demonstrated the capacity to strike outside of the Somali
borders, as evidence by the terrorist attacks in the
Republic of Uganda during the World Cup in July 2010.
Additionally, Al Shabaab has been responsible for recruiting
would-be militant from the Somali diaspora in the West.
The committee is concerned that the present strategy to
mitigate these threats lacks a holistic approach. While the
committee believes that kinetic options are an important
component to the overall strategy, the committee is
concerned that over-reliance on such options distracts from
the need for a comprehensive approach to reverse the gains
made by these regional affiliates and to protect the
homeland. In particular, a comprehensive strategy should
place greater emphasis on capacity building, particularly in
fragile states or areas that too easily become terrorist
sanctuaries. For this reason, the committee included section
1032 in Public Law 112-81, which requires National Security
Planning Guidance that would serve as an interagency
strategy to enhance the capacity of partner governments to
assist in eliminating the ability of Al Qaeda and its
affiliates to establish or maintain safe havens.
The June 2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism
highlights the need for building security partnerships as
part of comprehensive strategy. However, the committee
believes that U.S. and partnered counterterrorism (CT)
efforts require additional emphasis. Specifically, the
committee believes that activities that utilize U.S. Special
Operations Forces and an 'indirect approach' that leverages
local and indigenous forces should be used more aggressively
and surgically in Africa and the Arabian Peninsula in close
coordination with and in support of geographic combatant
commander and U.S. embassy country team requirements. The
committee believes that current indirect activities are not
fully resourced and underutilized to counter gains and
preclude the expansion of Al Qaeda affiliates in these
regions.
The committee believes a comprehensive strategy should also
include greater prioritization of capture operations of high
value terrorists. In 2009, former CIA Director, General
Michael Hayden, noted that information obtained during
interrogations of senior AQ members provided the majority of
U.S. intelligence regarding the terrorist organization and
had led to successful follow-on operations throughout the
world. The committee is concerned that the lack of a
comprehensive detention regime for high-value terrorists has
diminished U.S. intelligence on AQ and its affiliates.
The committee believes that an aggressive strategy that
builds security partnerships, develops host nation
capabilities, leverages such an indirect approach, and
prioritizes capture operations would effectively supplement
the need for kinetic options and presents a more balanced
approach. Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of
Defense to brief the congressional defense committees within
90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and
provide an update on efforts to counter the spread of Al
Qaeda regional affiliates and other efforts to improve
national security planning guidance pursuant to section 1032
of Public Law 112-81.
Senate authorizes $50 million for anti-Kony operations
May 25, 2012
The Senate Armed Services Committee has just voted to
authorize $50 million more "to fund the military's efforts
to support Central African troops who are trying to put an
end to Kony and his Lord's Resistance Army. The Pentagon's
name for this mission? Operation Observant Compass."
"… the bill still has to go Senate floor, where it's
expected to be considered in June or July, but influencing
the Armed Services Committee is a major first step, that
already makes Invisible Children the envy of a wide swath of
advocacy groups."
Sources: http://www.politico.com/morningdefense/ (direct
URL: http://tinyurl.com/d6572ba) and
http://www.theatlanticwire.com direct URL:
http://tinyurl.com/cgcysa7)
[Note: In the foreign aid bill, however, both House and
Senate also stress "language that would guarantee that the
U.S. continues to make it a priority to fund programs that
help protect civilians and rescue and rehabilitate LRA
abductees."
AfricaFocus Bulletin is an independent electronic
publication providing reposted commentary and analysis on
African issues, with a particular focus on U.S. and
international policies. AfricaFocus Bulletin is edited by
William Minter.
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