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Zimbabwe: New Narrative on Land Reform, 2
AfricaFocus Bulletin
Feb 26, 2013 (130226)
(Reposted from sources cited below)
Editor's Note
"Under the fast track land reform, 169,000 farmers have
received land since 2000. Most are small farmers under
model A1, but the fast track also includes model A2 with
land for wealthy people prepared to invest in largerscale
commercial farming--maintaining the dual
agriculture policy that had continued since the colonial
era. The 146,000 A1 farmers moved quickly onto their land
and are using more of the land than their white
predecessors. A2 farm allocation was more competitive and
politicized ... [nevertheless] The bulk of settlers are
'ordinary' people ... Undoubtedly some are political
elites or what are sometimes called 'cronies,' which we
guess to be 5% of farmers and 10% of land." - Hanlon,
Mantengwa, and Smart, in Zimbabwe Takes Back the Land
There is undoubtedly much room for debate on the detailed
research, conclusions, and emphases of this new book. But
it would be a serious mistake to regard it as another
chapter in the pro- or anti-Mugabe debate. With the
permission of authors and publishers, the two issues of
AfricaFocus Bulletin released today contain excerpts from
Chapters 1, 6, and 13, for readers to see for themselves
at least the basic shape of the argument.
This AfricaFocus Bulletin contains excerpts from Chapters
6, on the Second Land Reform, and 13, the conclusion, of
the book. Another AfricaFocus Bulletin sent out today by
e-mail and available on the web at http://www.africafocus.org/docs13/zim1302a.php, contains
excerpts from Chapter 1. These versions lack footnotes
and tables, which are are available in the full pdf
versions at
http://www.africafocus.org/docs13/zim1302a.pdf,
http://www.africafocus.org/docs13/zim1302b.pdf, and
http://www.africafocus.org/docs13/zim1302c.pdf
For previous AfricaFocus Bulletins on Zimbabwe, see
http://www.africafocus.org/country/zimbabwe.php
The book, published by Kumarian Press, an imprint of
Stylus Publishing (http://www.kpbooks.com), is available
for purchase at http://www.africafocus.org/books/isbn.php?1565495209
++++++++++++++++++++++end editor's note+++++++++++++++++
Zimbabwe Takes Back Its Land
Joseph Hanlon, Jeanette Manjengwa, and Teresa Smart
Kumarian Press, Stylus Publishing Sterling, Virginia
2012
Chapter 6: The Second Land Reform
Continuing land occupations; a series of laws,
amendments, and regulations; and a constitutional
amendment in 2000 created the "fast track" land reform,
but it happened so quickly that politicians and
government officials struggled to keep up. Many occupiers
farmed in the 2000/1 season even if land was not
allocated until the next year. When teams were sent to
mark out plots, some occupiers had to move to new plots.
Nevertheless, by 2003, nearly 135,000 families had been
given land, and by 2010 the number was up to nearly
169,000. In just three years, the bulk of Zimbabwean
farmland that had been in the hands of white farmers
passed to black smallholders, finally redressing a
century of colonial domination. Taking into account the
1980s land reform, 245,000 families (more than 1.5
million Zimbabweans) were living on their own farms.
Fast track continued the division between big commercial
farms and smallholdings, which has characterized
Zimbabwean agriculture since the colonial era, with two
models, A1 and A2. As a World Bank report commented, "One
of the objectives of the Fast Track was to enable local
indigenous people to exercise control of the large-scale
commercial farming sector. It targeted not only poor
people, but wealthy people willing to venture into
commercial farming."
A1 is the smallholder model for previously landless
people, with a typical white farm being divided into
40-45 A1 farms (see Table 6.1). This allows 6 ha of good
farmland (more in poorer areas) and usually some communal
grazing land, which is important since most farmers use
cattle for plowing. This is similar to the 1980s
resettlement model Provincial and District Land
Identification Committees. Plots tended to be pegged out
by extension officers. Roughly half of settlers were
jambanja occupiers, and the rest came through formal and
informal application processes. The Utete Committee
reported that in 2003, 97% of A1 farmers given land had
taken up their plots2 Government did try to help the new
A1 farmers, but Utete found that A1 farmers "required
inputs such as seed, fertilizer and tillage services and
that during the last cropping season [2002/3], inputs had
been given in a haphazard manner and in inadequate
quantities." Also, "budgetary allocations for the
Programme remained woefully inadequate."
The A2 model sought to create larger black commercial
farms and was based on splitting a white farm into three
to seven A2 farms. Applications had to be submitted to
the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement
and required recommendations by the Provincial and
District Land Identification Committees. The Ministry
placed advertisements in the main national newspapers
inviting people to apply, and application forms required
a business plan setting out cash flow and budgets as well
as specifying the applicant's income, property,
experience, qualifications, and training. Applicants were
required to have their own resources for farming without
government support. Special consideration was given to
war veterans, war collaborators, ex-detainees, and women.
Former academic Dr. Charles Utete was chief secretary to
the President and cabinet, and when he retired in April
2003, he was appointed to head the Presidential Land
Review Committee on the Implementation of the Fast Track
Land Reform Programme, the first detailed report on fast
track land reform. Often billed as a close advisor to
Robert Mugabe, he is subject to international sanctions6
and is on the Dongo list for having been leased a 3,350-
ha farm in Lomagundi, Mashonaland West, by the government
on October 1, 1991. Despite, or perhaps because of, his
political status, his report was detailed and set out
unflinchingly some of the problems of the fast track. In
particular, he was outspoken about disorganization and
bureaucratic and political infighting, which seemed to
have played a big role for A2 farms. The Integrated
Regional Information Network (IRIN) commented that the
report "lauded the goal of the government's fast-track
programme, but said agrarian reform was tarnished by
bureaucratic bungling and irregularities."
Half of A1 and A2 farms were formally assigned in 2000
and 2001, a quarter in 2002, and then smaller numbers
through 2006. Most A1 and A2 farmers started farming in
the year the land was allocated, and nearly all had
started by the year after allocation.
Five surveys give us a good picture of land-reform farms
and farmers and paint a relatively similar picture. Three
were national:
* The Utete Committee in 2003.
* A set of A2 Land Audit Reports for each province done
for the Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement
in 2006,10 which surveyed 10,513 farms, representing 79%
of the allocated A2 farms.
*The Baseline Survey by Sam Moyo and his team at the
African Institute for Agrarian Studies, who interviewed
2,089 resettlement households (1,651 A1 and 438 A2) in
early 2006 in six districts, one in each of six
provinces. This is still the most widely cited survey.
(The Moyo team also interviewed 760 farmworkers; see
chapter 12.)
In addition, two surveys cover specific geographic areas:
* The Masvingo survey was done by a team involving Ian
Scoones of the Institute of Development Studies, Sussex;
Nelson Marongwe in Harare; Crispen Sukume, formerly of
the Department of Agricultural Economics, University of
Zimbabwe; and Blasio Mavedzenge of Agritex, Masvingo, and
is published as Zimbabwe's Land Reform: Myths &
Realities. The team has been studying 400 fast track
farmers in Masvingo province since 2000; although this is
only one province, it still gives an excellent picture of
resettlement farmers.
* A 2004 survey conducted by a team headed by Prosper
Matondi, which looked closely at Mazowe district,
Mashonaland Central, and compiled data from 19 former
white farms divided into A1 plots and 13 divided into A2
farms.
Take-Up and Use Rates
These surveys allow us to draw a picture of how rapidly
the new farmers took up their land, and how much is being
used.
The Utete Committee found that 2,652 farms with 4.2 mn ha
had been allocated to 127,192 households under the A1
resettlement model as of July 31, 2003. The take-up rate
by beneficiaries was a very high 97%. By 2010, the total
was 145,800 beneficiaries with 5.8 mn ha (see Table 1.1).
Although the A1 resettlement went relatively smoothly,
the A2 model was more complex and moved more slowly. ...
For A2, Utete found that 1,672 former white farms with
2.2 mn ha had been allocated to 7,260 applicant
beneficiaries, with an average take-up rate of 66%
nationally. "This failure by some 34% of applicants to
take up their allocations implied a considerable amount
of land lying fallow or unused while, ironically,
thousands of would-be A2 beneficiaries were pressurising
the authorities to be allocated land," the Utete
Committee said. ...
Both the Baseline Survey and the A2 Land Audit looked at
land use in 2006. The Baseline Survey (Table 6.2) shows
that a quarter of new farmers were already using nearly
all of their arable land. More than half of A1 farmers
and 43% of A2 farmers were using more than 40% of their
arable land. As white farmers had been using only between
15% and 34% of their land, this suggests that the new
farmers had very quickly begun to use more of their land
than their predecessors. ...
Who Received Land?
The way the questions were asked, and the extent to which
people had to choose a single attribute for themselves,
varied between surveys. Tables 6.3-6.6 give a variety of
descriptions of land-reform beneficiaries. What is
striking is that the various surveys give quite similar
results.
For smallholders, Tables 6.3 and 6.5, giving the origins
of resettlement farmers from the Baseline Survey and the
Masvingo study, both show most A1 farmers came from the
communal areas; both surveys also find that 1% came from
1980s resettlement or purchase farms. Both also show a
significant group of urban poor. Tables 6.4 and 6.5 also
show a significant group of new smallholders from the
military and civil service. The Masvingo sample of A1
farms, where the recipients were identified from lists,
found that 66% were "ordinary"20 (Table 6.5).
The Baseline Survey, the A2 Land Audit, and the Masvingo
study asked questions about A2 farms in different ways,
making it hard to summarize the results together,
although it is clear that many A2 farmers are "ordinary"
people. A large share of A2 farmers came from urban
areas, reflecting the need to mobilize finances. The
Baseline Survey found that while 77% of A1 farmers lived
on the farm and only 17% still lived in urban areas, only
60% of A2 farmers lived on their farms and 34% lived in
urban areas. The Baseline Survey also found that 45% of
A2 farmers retained other jobs (17% working for the
government)--underlining the need to continue to raise
money to develop A2 farms.
The surveys also provided a range of other information.
The A2 Land Audit showed that education levels were quite
high: 17% of A2 farmers had formal agricultural training
and another 13% had university degrees.
...
Elites and Cronies?
One of the frequent complaints about the land-reform
program is that large amounts of land (often cited as
40%) have gone to "Mugabe's cronies." Table 1.1 shows
that 13.5 mn ha of former white land have been
transferred to black farmers since independence. Of that,
9.5 mn ha (71%) went to smallholders--1980s resettlement
and A1 farmers. Another 3 mn ha (22%) went to small A2
farmers, and 1 mn ha (7%) to large A2 farmers and black,
large-scale commercial farmers.
Since independence, Zimbabwe has followed the colonial
dual agricultural strategy of big, commercial farms and
smallholders. Although A2 farms are smaller than the old
white farms, they are still large and capital-intensive,
and applicants had to prove they had money to invest.
Many of the holders on the black, large-scale commercial
farms bought their farms. By definition, this is an
elite; these are relatively well-off or even wealthy
people. One cannot support continuation of large-scale
commercial farming, as most of the international
community does, and then object that the farms are in the
hands of an elite.
Just as in the colonial era the white regime gave land as
rewards to its supporters, the independence government
has done the same thing. Indeed, politics in most
countries (including Europe and the United States) has a
certain amount of patronage, rewarding key supporters of
winning political parties.
With both A2 and whole farms, being in Zanu-PF or having
friends among the right people must have helped. But does
this make all 23,000 A2 and large-scale farmers "Mugabe
cronies"? We are not willing to dismiss such a large
group of people so easily, even though some people at the
top have multiple farms that are among the largest and
best. If we are to object to big farms being held by an
elite, it means objecting to the whole system of having
A2 and large-scale farms, because only an elite can
afford the investment. Similarly, applicants for A2 farms
had to show they had money to invest, so it is not
surprising that most A2 farmers have urban links (see
Tables 6.3 and 6.5). Blasio Mavedzenge, a member of Ian
Scoones's research team and an agricultural extension
officer, is also an A1 farmer and says, "I am a
government worker, but I am not a crony, and I think that
applies to many people."
In this context, "cronies" could be described as people
who received large or multiple farms mainly because of
their close links to Zanu-PF or the government, and who
would not have qualified otherwise. Unquestionably, some
"cronies" have received land--and some of the best land,
and they often received tractors and other support not
available to ordinary land-reform farmers. Table 6.6
shows that 130 A2 farms, about 1.2% of all A2 farms
surveyed, went to people in the office of the President
and cabinet, and another 38 farms went to ministers. And
according to the Dongo list, among large farms that have
been leased to individual farmers by the state, there is
quite a sprinkling of generals, ministers, judges, and
others with obvious political or military links. And
several hundred people have multiple farms, or farms that
are larger than the maximum sizes set in 200127 (see
Tables 9.1 and 9.2). There are no precise figures, in
part because the "comprehensive, transparent and
nonpartisan land audit . . . for the purpose of
establishing accountability and eliminating multiple farm
ownerships" called for in the Global Political Agreement
(GPA) (5.9) has not been carried out.
It is important to remember that self-funded, large-scale
farming ensures that all big farmers are in the elite.
But not all are "cronies." For example, on the Dongo
list, there are also significant numbers of agronomists
and professional farmers as well as engineers, doctors,
and other professionals. We estimate that less than 5% of
new farmers with under 10% of the land are "cronies."
...
Hyperinflation and Divisive Politics
Land reform did not start at the most auspicious time.
Two years of drought hit the new farmers. The Zimbabwe
dollar, which had been Z$19 to the US$1 in 1997, had
fallen to Z$55 to the US$1 by 2000. It reached Z$1,000 to
US$1 in mid-2002. Gideon Gono was named governor of the
Reserve Bank in November 2003, and his policy was to
expand the economy by printing money and subsidizing
local production and key goods, while using
administrative means to try to control inflation and
speculation. This heterodox policy failed and led instead
to corruption and hyperinflation. By January 2006, the
exchange rate was Z$100,000 to US$1, and by mid-2007, the
parallel (unofficial) rate was Z$100,000,000 to US$1. By
mid-2008, the parallel rate for the US dollar was
equivalent to the Z$ with 13 zeros and prices were
doubling daily; by the end of 2008, it was 22 zeros (see
Table 6.7).
This was one of the worst cases of hyperinflation ever
and caused chaos for everyone, including farmers.
Corruption became more serious as members of the elite
could exchange money at meaningless official rates, and
thus build mansions for a few thousand dollars; by
mid-2007, the parallel exchange rate was 1,000 times the
official rate. Sporadic government interventions in
agricultural input and output, transport, interest rates,
and the foreign exchange markets only exacerbated the
crisis. Controlled prices of inputs (seeds, fertilizer,
fuel) and services such as tillage provision at levels
far too low to cover costs of production or repairs (in
the case of machinery) led to shortages and low
production because suppliers could not cover their costs.
At the same time, a parallel high-priced market emerged.
National fertilizer production fell from 505,000 tonnes
in 1999 to 166,000 tonnes in 2007. Government
intervention in the transport sector, both road and rail,
also did not work. Hyperinflation brought sudden benefits
for some people--for example, when diesel or fertilizer
had to be sold at an official price and cost pennies in
real terms, those who could gain access (which sometimes
included ordinary farmers) could use the input or swap it
for something else. Farmers moved to informal marketing
and barter for both sales and inputs and increasingly
depended on relatives sending money from abroad.
Shingirai Mandizadza, who was staying on Athlone Farm in
Mashonaland East doing interviews in 2008, reports
traders passing through selling clothing and household
goods such as soap; a skirt cost three buckets of maize.
Cattle were also being traded for inputs and equipment.
Government attempts to use force to halt inflation hit
land-reform farmers. Breakup of white farms and changed
settlement patterns caused a radical change in trading
patterns, with many new small traders marketing beef and
other goods, and with the opening of informal markets
closer to where people were living on resettlement farms.
In 2005, government launched Operation Murambatsvina to
try to eliminate the huge informal trading sector that
had grown up under liberalization. The new unregistered
markets serving resettlement farmers were destroyed. "In
many urban areas, this campaign was directed against
opposition supporters, and became highly politicised,
displacing many people. But in the new resettlements,
this was not the case, with Zanu-PF supporters and war
veterans suffering as much as others," notes Ian Scoones
and his team, reporting that even an appeal by a war
veteran leader of an occupation was unsuccessful in
protecting a local market. It was only in 2009, with
dollarization, that the local markets were restored.
...
It is estimated that by 2007, 2 million people had left
Zimbabwe, half of them for South Africa--continuing a
migration that had started under structural adjustment.
They were sending back an estimated $500 million per
year. But UNDP noted that "the impact of the brain drain
on public service delivery has been devastating. For
example, in the case of health care, it is estimated that
more than 80% of the doctors, nurses, pharmacists,
radiologists and therapists who trained since 1980 have
left."42
Our interviews in 2011 showed two surprising responses.
First, the recovery with dollarization was so rapid that
people did not much mention the hyperinflationary period
and were looking forward. Second, when asked, farmers
were not so negative about hyperinflation. They did
receive some supplies from the government, for example,
in 2005/6, one-third of A1 farmers obtained some seed
from the government. Negative real interest rates meant
that loans were repaid at a fraction of their real cost,
and inputs, when available, were almost free. Under
dollarization, they complained, loans had to be repaid,
and inputs were always available but too expensive.
Nevertheless, farmers are voting with their hands and
producing and selling more under dollarization.
Political Crisis
...
The mood changed after the [2008 first-round]
inconclusive elections. Key Zanu-PF officials started
accusing the opposition of being "traitors," "sellouts,"
"witches," and "prostitutes." Just before the first
election, Zimbabwe Defence Forces Commander Constantine
Chiwenga had said, "The army will not support or salute
sellouts and agents of the West before, during and after
the presidential elections. We will not support anyone
other than President Mugabe." Mugabe himself said he
would never allow "the land that we fought for to be
taken by the MDC and given to the whites." Later he
noted, "Soon after the March elections war veterans
approached me and said that they would take up arms if
Tsvangirai won the elections in order to protect their
farms and nation's sovereignty. . . . A ballpoint pen
[used to mark a ballot paper] cannot argue with a
bazooka. The veterans will not allow it."
The observer mission of the Pan-African Parliament (part
of the African Union [AU]) found that "political
tolerance in Zimbabwe has deteriorated to the lowest ebb
in recent history. . . . The prevailing political
environment throughout the country was tense, hostile and
volatile as it has been characterised by an electoral
campaign marred by high levels of intimidation, violence,
displacement of people, abductions, and loss of life. . .
. Houses burnt down, people assaulted and sustained
serious injuries. Violence disrupted normal life of
ordinary Zimbabweans and led to internal displacement of
people. . . . A number of cases of abduction, some of
which resulted in deaths, were reported." The observers'
report continued: "The Mission was able to attend star
rallies organised by the Presidential candidate of ZanuPF.
However, it noted with grave concern that the MDC
Presidential candidate was not accorded the opportunity
to hold rallies. The Mission was disturbed by the
numerous arrests that the MDC Presidential candidate was
subjected to."
Tsvangirai withdrew from the second round on June 22,
citing violence against his party's supporters. On June
22, then-UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon issued a
statement saying he "deeply regrets that, despite the
repeated appeals of the international community, the
Government of Zimbabwe has failed to put in place the
conditions necessary for free and fair run-off elections.
. . . The campaign of violence and intimidation that has
marred this election has done a great disservice to the
people of the country and must end immediately." The
election went ahead and Mugabe was elected.
...
The election result was tainted and the economy was in
crisis due to hyperinflation, so negotiations resumed,
with AU and SADC support. A Memorandum of Understanding
was signed on July 21, 2008, by Robert Mugabe (as
president of Zanu-PF), Morgan Tsvangirai and Arthur
Mutambara (as presidents of "the two Movement for
Democratic Change [MDC] formations"), and South African
president Thabo Mbeki (as SADC facilitator). This led to
the September 15, 2008, GPA. On February 11, 2009, Morgan
Tsvangirai was sworn in as prime minister of Zimbabwe in
a new Government of National Unity (GNU).
In December 2008 and January 2009, foreign currencies
were legalized and the South African rand (in the south)
and the US dollar (in most of the country) became the
normal currencies; soon civil servants were paid in US
dollars, the Z$ was abolished in April 2009, and the
government switched to accounting in US dollars.
A 2011 analysis by the South African-based African Centre
for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) said
that "since the conclusion of the GPA, there have been
visible changes [but] the coalition government is at a
critical juncture and it faces multiple challenges in
Zimbabwe's political and economic terrain." It continued:
"Although the GNU has been welcomed by many as the
antidote to Zimbabwe's crisis and much has been
celebrated about its achievements, the Zimbabwe conflict
is still very fluid as conditions shift everyday due to
the belligerent nature of the relationship between ZanuPF
and the MDC."
...
Summing Up: Progress Despite Tensions
Under the fast track land reform, 169,000 farmers have
received land since 2000. Most are small farmers under
model A1, but the fast track also includes model A2 with
land for wealthy people prepared to invest in largerscale
commercial farming--maintaining the dual
agriculture policy that had continued since the colonial
era. The 146,000 A1 farmers moved quickly onto their land
and are using more of the land than their white
predecessors. A2 farm allocation was more competitive and
politicized, while the need for capital slowed the A2
farmers' occupation of their land. The bulk of settlers
are "ordinary" people, with 17% of A1 farmers and 18%-27%
of A2 farmers coming from the civil service (which
includes teachers and agricultural extension officers as
well as an elite). Undoubtedly some are political elites
or what are sometimes called "cronies," which we guess to
be 5% of farmers and 10% of land.
Sanctions have been imposed on Zimbabwean leaders and
banks. Most aid agencies will not work with land-reform
farmers.
Hyperinflation in 2005-8 was the result of printing money
and had a devastating effect on the economy. Elections in
2008 were violent, which led to AU- and SADC-sponsored
talks, which eventually led to a GPA in 2009 with
opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai becoming prime
minister.
In January 2009, the US dollar became the currency, which
ended hyperinflation and brought a rapid economic
recovery.
Chapter 13: Conclusion
Occupied and Productive
...
In the biggest land reform in Africa, 6,000 white farmers
have been replaced by 245,000 Zimbabwean farmers. Some
settled in the 1980s, but most since 2000. These are
primarily ordinary poor people who have become more
productive farmers. The change was inevitably disruptive
at first, but production is increasing rapidly.
Agricultural production is now returning to the 1990s
level, and resettlement farmers already grow 40% of the
country's tobacco and 49% of its maize. As Barry Floyd
noted in his PhD thesis more than 50 years ago, "Tobacco
in its growth pays scant attention to the pigment of the
plowman's skin."
As we've said earlier, it takes a generation for farmers
to master their new land. White farmers, especially war
veterans, had extensive support in the 1950s--and, as we
saw, only a third became successful. Zimbabwe's first
land reform, in the 1980s under willing seller, willing
buyer, where the former colonizers kept the best land but
there was some initial support, the new farmers, on
average, did well, increasing production and reducing
poverty. "Resettled farmers were found to be more
productive, on average, than communal farmers," according
to long-term research by Bill Kinsey, and there is
"enormous scope for many farmers to catchup to the best
farmers in the sample."
The fast track land reform in 2000 was largely selffunded
with little support, but fast track farmers had
the enthusiasm of occupiers and they had finally taken
the best land. On average, the fast track farmers are
doing well, raising their living standards and increasing
production, and over the next decade can be expected to
continue growing--the best are doing very well, and a
middle group is still catching up.
Not All the Same
The British colonizers developed a dual agriculture
system, with most people on smallholdings and a
privileged group having larger farms. And they racialized
the land, defining some land as "European" and some land
as "African." On the surface, the dual system and racial
land definitions have continued since independence. But
beneath the language of "white farmers" and "large-scale
farms," there have been changes. In terms of farm size,
Zimbabweans improved on their teachers--the small farms
are bigger, and the large farms are smaller--leading to
better land use and increased commercial production.
Similarly, the colonial shorthand of white and black
farmers is still used, but in reality neither group is
homogeneous. White farmers became famous because some
were highly profitable and productive. Yet, as a group,
at independence, white farmers were using less than onethird
of their land, and most were not doing very well-one
-third were insolvent and one-third were only breaking
even. The white minority fought a brutal war to maintain
its privilege and power, yet after independence, many in
the white community took places in the new Zimbabwe.
There are still white farmers like Keith Campbell who
have built good relationships with land-reform farmers
and other white Zimbabweans are involved in agribusiness.
On the side of the land-reform farmers, there are the
hugely successful farmers like Fanuel Mutandiro and
Esther Makwara, who use every corner of their land. There
are vacant plots and farmers who are doing very poorly.
And there are many in between, struggling to invest and
grow, sometimes supported by contract farming. The
decision to maintain a large-scale farming sector
accessible only to the better-off remains controversial,
and some of those farms have been given to influential
people. Yet even the so-called "cronies" are not
homogeneous--some are sitting on the land hoping to sell
or lease it, while others are highly productive and hope
to get rich from farming.
Pumpkins and Getting On With Farming
Land reform can never be neat or simple anywhere in the
world. Land is a finite resource that is taken away from
one group and given to another. And land reform usually
takes place at times of economic and social stress or
transition. Intense political and social conflicts are
inevitable--from the level of setting goals and
priorities down to the distribution of bags of
fertilizer. These debates will continue in Zimbabwe, and
many issues remain unresolved. But it is essential to
step back from the loud, angry, and continuing media and
political confrontations to talk to the people who have
land--the actual farmers.
The most striking memory of the research for this book is
how proud the fast track farmers are of their new farms.
They were anxious to take us around, insisting that we
see every field and hear in detail about the new tobacco
barn. They were pleased with their production. A1 farmers
insisted on giving us something, and each day we returned
home with a carload of pumpkins.
Land reform has taken place under often inauspicious
conditions, and with waxing and waning political support.
... Fast track started with occupations by war veterans
in opposition to Zanu-PF and took place under the cloud
of political conflict and sanctions. The 2005-8
hyperinflation, one of the worst in history, affected the
new farmers as much as everyone else. What is most
remarkable is that, despite the problems, farmers have
made both land reforms work--creating successes on the
ground despite the continuing confusion over their heads.
And despite confused and changing instructions from the
top, the government extension agency Agritex has provided
important support to the new farmers.
The Global Political Agreement (GPA) in late 2008 and
unity government in 2009 have proved vital in creating
the stability needed to move forward. Dollarization in
January 2009 prompted a remarkably rapid economic
turnaround and has been central in allowing small farmers
to obtain inputs and sell their produce.
Political tensions remain and international hostility,
represented by sanctions, continues. Problems remain,
particularly around environment and former farmworkers.
And a huge amount of reconstruction is still required--to
finish redressing the heritage of minority rule, recreate
the 60,000 or more jobs lost under structural
adjustment, and repair the damage hyperinflation did to
the economy.
... researcher Tendai Murisa, who studied farmer groups,
warns that fast track resettlement areas not "receiving
support from development and relief NGOs is convenient
for both civil society and the state." International
civil society "can continue to dismiss the land reform
process as largely benefiting politically connected
elites. In the meantime the Zanu-PF dominated state
remains the only active external agent in providing
support."
The GPA and public opinion now recognize there is no
going back on land reform. It may have been chaotic and
ad hoc, but it will not be reversed. So it is now
possible to look forward to how agriculture can be
supported and all farmers promoted to produce more.
Getting out of the hole caused by political tensions and
hyperinflation has required so much attention that few
people have been able to look at the longer-term
implications of land reform. And as the liberation
generation retires, the process will be steered by new
people thinking about economic and social development.
...
Impressions
It is the images that stick in the mind--walking into
living rooms of both A1 farmers and elite A2 farmers to
find the furniture has been moved out and the room filled
with sacks of maize and groundnuts, or noting that money
has been used to buy machinery rather than new furniture
or a fancy car.
These are educated, high-tech farmers. A1 farmers have
mobile phones even if they have no electricity, they know
the varieties of hybrid maize and which fertilizers and
pesticides go with them, and they plow with oxen and
tractors--these are not hoe farmers as one would see
across the border in Mozambique. A2 farmers are using the
Internet to check on animal feed and crops and to arrange
export contracts. And we heard two things repeatedly at
both A1 and A2 levels--"farming is a business" and "you
must have a plan." Farming is difficult anywhere, facing
the vagaries of markets and weather, but the good
farmers--small and large--are doing their sums and
thinking long term. They know they have had these farms
for a decade or less, and there is still a lot to do.
For Zimbabweans, it is not the land itself that is
important, but farming. Agriculture is seen as a means of
betterment and accumulation, and people are prepared to
work at it and get their hands dirty. For ordinary A1
farmers, increased production provides a better house and
better life for themselves and their children. For the
best A1 farmers, maize or tobacco or soya gives them
higher profits than the salary of a teacher or civil
servant. And for A2 farmers, there is the potential for
serious money that will come, not from land speculation,
but from growing crops and cattle. And farmers were angry
when they pointed out the unused and underused plots--A1
plotholders who still lived in Harare and A2 cell phone
farmers or cronies speculating in land--because the empty
land stood out like sore thumbs amid the other productive
farms.
The farmers' attitudes were matched by the approach of
researchers. Zimbabwe is the most literate country in
Africa, and the University of Zimbabwe has a high
standard of research. But more than that, we were struck
by the willingness of researchers to go out to rural
areas and spend long days there, sometimes interviewing
hundreds of farmers. Research is not something they do
just sitting at a desk; researchers, too, are willing to
get their hands dirty. This book would have been
impossible without the high-quality research already done
by Zimbabweans--and their willingness to share. We came
away not just with pumpkins, but with many papers and
research reports as well.
The final impression is just how quickly Zimbabweans are
recovering from the hyperinflation era, and how outsiders
(even Zimbabweans abroad) have missed that change. The
introduction of the US dollar as currency in January 2009
brought an end to one of the world's worst
hyperinflations and brought a return of economic life
much more quickly than many expected. In May 2011, when
we did much of our fieldwork, the Harare supermarkets
were packed with goods and shoppers, and farmers were
selling their maize and tobacco to pay school fees and
buy seed. Of course, there are not enough dollars--
physically, in the sense that the dollar bills handed
over at the toll booths on the roads out of Harare are
tattered and dirty, and economically, in that most people
remain poor and farmers are under-capitalized.
Nevertheless, in a remarkable way Zimbabweans have moved
on--the economy seems "normal" and people talk about the
hyperinflation time only if you ask.
Thus, outside commentators tend to underestimate two
aspects of Zimbabwe. The first is the tie to the land and
farming, even for academics and elites. The other is the
speed of the recovery under dollarization, itself a
testament to the resilience and creativity of
Zimbabweans, but also showing that the economic crisis of
2005-8 was caused by hyperinflation and not land reform.
Zimbabwe's land reform has not been neat, and huge
problems remain. But 245,000 new farmers have received
land, and most of them are farming it. They have raised
their own standard of living; have already reached
production levels of the former white farmers; and, with
a bit of support, are ready to substantially increase
that production. In 1952, Godfrey Huggins, prime minister
of Southern Rhodesia, said, "The ultimate possessors of
the land will be the people who can make the best use of
it." Sixty years later, this has come to pass.
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